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MARTHA  MINOW*
INTRODUCTION
As entertainment, confusion  can  be a rich source of comedy.  In
health  care, in  contrast,  confusion  can  be  a  silent danger  to  crucial
policy judgments.  In  comedy,  a  classic  routine  starts  with  the  ques-
tion, "Who's on first?" asked by a baseball fan who does not know that
the first baseman's  name  is "Who."  Similarly, in health care, a classic
set of difficulties  circle around without addressing the basic question,
"who is the patient?"  I will suggest today that despite the nearly uni-
versal assumption that patients are single bodily individuals, a range of
circumstances  require  clinicians  to  treat  families,  household  mem-
bers,  sexual  partners,  and  even  entire  communities  as  patients.  By
asking  "who's the  patient?"  I hope  to illuminate how contemporary
discussions  of the  doctor-patient  relationship  wrongly  proceed  with
the assumption that the patient is alone in this relationship and  that
cases  involving  families  and  friends  are  the  unusual,  complicated
ones.  Instead,  I suggest that  the  normal case  is one involving  family
and  perhaps friends, and the conception  of the roles of doctors  and
nurses must be  shaped in this context.
The recognition that families and friends are crucially involved in
the doctor-patient relationship  is especially challenging to the still-re-
cent arrival of patient autonomy as a central commitment in medical
ethics.  What can and what should autonomy of the individual patient
mean in light of the  relationships  with  others  that can  be  crucial  in
preventing,  diagnosing,  treating,  and  managing  health  conditions?
When cost containment  concerns  point  toward  reliance  upon-and
potential manipulation of-the patient's intimate relationships, newly
won commitments  to patient autonomy are especially in jeopardy.  By
highlighting the significance of the patient's relationships with others,
I  make no argument against respect  for patient  autonomy;  instead I
*  Professor,  Harvard  Law  School.  This essay was  presented as  the Rome  Lecture  at
the University  of Maryland  School of Law,  March  23,  1994.  I  appreciate  comments  on
earlier presentations  to the Pew Health Policy Program Annual Meeting, June 7,  1993; the
Harvard  Program  on  Ethics  and  the  Professions;  and  the  Harvard  Division  on Medical
Ethics.  I  would  like  to  thank  particularly  Emily  Schulman,  Rebecca  Dresser,  Michael
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1173MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
argue for reconceiving patient autonomy in light of the patient's rela-
tionships with  intimate  others.
I.  PATIENTS  IN  PRACTICE
Nearly all the theories of medical ethics presume that the central
focus  of medical ethics is the relationship  between the physician  and
the patient-each treated as a single person.  Thanks  to recent efforts
by David Rothman and others,  the "physician"-side of that dyad is re-
ceiving clarifying correction.  Rothman began his book, Strangers at the
Bedside, with  this comment:
As late as 1969, the philosopher HansJonas could assert that
"the physician is obligated  to the patient and to no one else
....  We  may speak of a sacred trust; strictly by its terms, the
doctor  is,  as  it were,  alone  with  his  patient and  God."  But
even  as he wrote,  the image  of a physician  alone with  a pa-
tient was being supplanted by one of an examining room  so
crowded that the physician had difficulty squeezing in and of
a patient surrounded  by strangers.1
The  rest of Rothman's  book discusses  the  new  complexities  doctors
face due to the growth of medical  specialties;  the rise of human sub-
jects review committees and hospital  ethics committees; various fiscal
controls  such  as  Diagnosis  Related  Groups  (DRGs);2  and  emerging
judicial and legislative  regulation  of health care  decisions.'  I  believe
that  Rothman's  own  argument  would  be  strengthened  by  paying
greater attention  to the expanding  roles of health care  providers, fo-
cusing especially  on the expanding  role of nurses.
More fundamentally, I will argue the patient side of the equation
also requires equal attention and explanation.  I will briefly describe a
range of situations  demonstrating the  complexity about patients  that
deserves attention.  On one extreme, some clinical practice has always,
by  necessity,  dealt with  more  than one  person  or individual  as  "the
patient."  Pregnancy  is  an obvious  instance  in which  "the patient  in
the  bed" cannot  fully  be  described  as  a single  person.  Dramatized
1.  DAVIDJ.  ROTHMAN,  STRANGERS  AT THE BEDSIDE  1 (1991)  (quoting HansJonas, Philo-
sophical  Reflections on Experimenting  with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS  219  (1969)).
2.  DRGs  were  created  by the  Tax  Equity  and  Fiscal  Responsibility  Act  (TEFRA).
AMERICAN  COLLEGE OF  LEGAL MEDICINE,  LEGAL  MEDICINE:  LEGAL DYNAMICS  OF MEDICAL  EN-
CouNTERs  427  (1988).  Under  this system,  Medicare  pays  hospitals  a uniform,  fixed pay-
ment,  which  is  determined  mostly  by  the 'patient's  diagnosis  rather  than  the  care  or
treatment the patient actually receives.  Id. Accordingly, the payment remains the same for
a particular ailment regardless  of whether  the patient spends one week  or 15  days in  the
hospital.  Id.
3.  See generally id.
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today with the  use  of ultrasound  and  the  possibility  of intrauterine
treatment, pregnancy presents the medical world with the woman and
the fetus whose interests are usually joined, but on occasion  may not
be. 4
Contagious  diseases  present an  example  in which  the  "patient"
easily includes more than one person.  Forty years ago, Michael Balint
usefully identified the contrasts among the presenting patient, the key
patient, and the treatable patient.5  In this light, the health care  pro-
vider must come  to perceive  the  individual who  presents  himself or
herself at the  office  as a member  of a network of relationships  that
potentially includes others who may have underlying or treatable  con-
ditions.  Moreover, public health approaches to managing contagious
diseases have long identified the chains of relationships between peo-
ple that are relevant to both treatment and prevention  and make the
presenting patient simply the initial contact in what will become a se-
ries of patients  to be tested and  potentially treated.
When genetic  testing becomes germane  to diagnosing a particu-
lar patient's condition, the histories of family members assist the treat-
ment  of  "the  patient  in  the  bed,"  and  family  members  may  also
become patients if they subsequently receive testing that reveals a sim-
ilar  condition.  Accordingly,  both  contagious  diseases  and  certain
kinds of genetic markers present the health care world with issues that
begin with one patient but often lead  to the identification  and treat-
ment of other patients.
This pattern reveals limitations in conventional rules that seek to
promote patient autonomy.  For example, rules about confidentiality 6
and  informed  consent7  have  been  formed  on  the  assumption  that
only one patient is involved, when, in reality, a physician  may be treat-
ing family members who  may have  exposed one another  to a conta-
gious  disease,  such  as  HIV,  or  who  may  share  genetically-linked
conditions.  To respect the autonomy of each  patient while pursuing
their health  interests, the goals behind confidentiality  and informed
4.  More  than one  person must be viewed  as  "the patient" in  the  far more  unusual
situation  of Siamese  twins.
5.  See generally MICHAEL  BALINT,  THE  DocrOR, His PATIENT  AND  THE  ILLNESS  (1954).
6.  Confidentiality  refers  to  patients'  right  to keep  their person and  records  private
unless they consent or the law requires disclosure.  Indeed, "
[a] ccess to a patient's body and
to confidential  medical information  is limited to the primary health care team  specifically
rendering care to the patient, and to others with  special permission."  AMERICAN  COLLEGE
OF  LEGAL MEDICINE,  supra note 2,  at 208.
.7.  Informed consent involves "informing  the patient of the nature of diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures,  and their advantages and disadvantages, such that the patient may
participate  in  accepting or rejecting  procedures."  Id  at 118.MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
consent require conversations with patients about their intimate rela-
tionships, and the rules on confidentiality and informed consent may
even  require modification  to protect  the interests  of other patients.
Family members or close associates to a patient may also become
patients in the sense of falling within the primary responsibility of the
health  care provider when the initial patient dies, especially when the
family member reacts to the news in an extreme way.'  More basically,
many health  care  providers  acknowledge  and  attend  to the ways  in
which the actual incidence  of disease and conditions of health status
reflect  interpersonal  relationships.  One  recent  book  concluded,
"There is now a mass of evidence to indicate that [social]  support may
be one of the critical factors distinguishing those who remain healthy
from those who fall ill."9  The psychological  sensitivity of the immune
system'0  is simply one domain of such evidence.  For example, studies
confirm that "[f]or  women, both  psychologic  and physical  symptom
levels were  significantly lower  among those who  had  confidants  and
friends.""  Similarly, family members can often be the cause not only
of contagious  diseases  but also of psychosocial  factors affecting  non-
contagious diseases or disabilities. 2  The interaction of health statuses
of spouses  is  a striking  example.'"  Given  these  studies,  any serious
consideration  of  preventive  health  care  involves  family  members,
friends,  and coworkers.  Dr. Leon  Eisenberg taught us of the  impor-
tance of family, friends, and coworkers  in a patient's decision to seek
health care' 4  and  in a patient's  own  progress  toward  wellness.'5  In
debates over whether to extend health care benefits to domestic part-
ners of employees,  employers  also  are persuaded  by evidence  of the
8.  ROBERT  BucKmAN,  How TO  BREAK  BAD  NEWS:  A GUIDE  FOR  HEALTH  CARE  PROFES-
SIONALS  183  (1992)  (noting that the patient's family may become the health  care worker's
primary  responsibility and also  noting the difficulty  of dealing with  the  family when a  pa-
tient dies unexpectedly).
9.  MARC  PILISUK &  SusAN  HILLIER  PARKS,  THE HEAUNG  WEB:  SOCIAL  NETWORKS  AND
HUMAN  SURVIVAL  29  (1986).
10.  Id. at 40-41  (noting that social support affects  those systems of the body designed to
deal with the  externalities that cause illness).
11.  Leon Eisenberg,  What Makes Persons "Patients"  and Patients "Well"?, 69 AM. J.  MED.
277,  282  (1980).
12.  David D. Schmidt,  The Family as the Unit of Medical Care, 7J. FAM.  PRAc.  303  (1979).
13.  See Eisenberg, supra note  11,  at 283  (explaining that research  has shown  that age-
specific mortality rates  are two to four times greater for widowers than for married men);
Schmidt, supra note 12; see alsoJohn  G. Bruhn, Effects of Chronic  Illness on the Family, 4J. FAM.
PRAc.  1057,  1057-60  (1977)  (discussing the detrimental  effects of chronic  illness on family
members).
14.  See Eisenberg, supra note  11,  at 279 (noting that patients often discuss their health
status with family and friends  before visiting health  care providers).
15.  See  id. at 284.
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relevance of the relationship  between the health status of and care for
household  members to the health and well-being of their employees.
Thus, the "patient in the bed" may be treated effectively only through
careful  assessment  of the  individual's  relationships  with  others  and
sometimes  interventions  involving  others  will  be necessary  for treat-
ment and for preventive  measures.
Probably most familiar to health care providers is the significance
of  family  members  and  close  friends  in  contributing  to  decisions
about care for those individuals who cannot make decisions for them-
selves.  In  this circumstance,  the others  involved  in  the decisionmak-
ing are  not patients,  and  their  individual  preferences  and opinions
are not viewed  as "factors" or "information sources" relevant to treat-
ment.  Nevertheless,  the  intimates  of the patient provide  norms, val-
ues, or information  about the patient's own preferences and interests
when  a  treatment  decision  must be  made.  The dramatic  growth  of
heroic  or extraordinary care 6 involves  health care  providers in close
relationships with the families or friends of partially or fully incompe-
tent patients, whether  those patients are children or gravely impaired
adults.
When someone besides the ostensible patient provides the source
of knowledge  about the patient's  history, desires, or treatment  direc-
tion, ethicists and lawyers establish fictions to protect the image of the
doctor treating the solitary and autonomous patient.  One such fiction
is "substituted judgment." 17  Such fancy verbal footwork is a sign  that
something else  may  be going on.  The  health care  professionals may
sincerely  try  to  preserve  the  single  patient  as  the  primary  focus  for
care.  Even if this is their goal, however, it is necessary that the medical
team be closely involved with those who are intimately affected by the
welfare,  care, and aftercare  of the patient." 8  Moreover,  cross-cultural
comparisons  of medical  practices  indicate  the  great  significance  of
family in many cultures and recommend degrees of involvement and
16.  Heroic  or  extraordinary care  involves the  use  of extreme  measures  to keep a  pa-
tient  alive  when  death  is  imminent.  PRESIDENT'S  COMM'N  FOR  THE  STUDY  OF  ETHICAL
PROBLEMS  IN  MEDICINE  AND BIOMEDICAL  AND BEHAVIORAL  RESEARCH,  DECIDING  TO  FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING  TR.ATMENT 83-87  (1983).
17.  Substituted judgment involves the appointment of a surrogate for patients who are
not competent  to make  medical  decisions  for  themselves.  To  the  best of their  abilities,
these surrogates should make decisions in the same manner as the patient would have.  Id.
at 44-45.
18.  Se  RICHARD  SHERLOCK  &  C.  MARY  DINGUS,  FAMILIES  AND  THE  GRAVELY ILL:  ROLES,
RULES, AND  RIGHTS  147  (1988)  (arguing that health care providers must elicit information
from  the patient's family members  to  provide  the patient the best care).MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
deference  to  family  members  in  patient  decisions  that  might  be
deemed  violations of patient autonomy in  other contexts. 19
Moving even further away from the idea that anyone but the pa-
tient-in-the-bed  is the subject of the medical care, family members, or
other  intimate  associates,  can  be  crucial  to  providing  patient  care.
The patient  care provided  by intimates affects  the cure or healing of
stroke  victims,  orthopedic  patients, alcoholics,  obese  individuals,  pa-
tients with high risk of heart disease, and candidates for organ trans-
plants.20   Further,  decisions  about  whether  to  hospitalize,
institutionalize,  or discharge  patients  center  on the  capacity  of inti-
mates  to  provide  care  and  support  for  the  patient.  Ruth  Macklin
writes of the ethical dilemma presented by an eighty-four-year-old  hos-
pital patient who  desired to be discharged so that he could live with
his thirty-five-year-old  son even though that son had previously failed
to  provide  his father  with  proper care  and  nutrition.  The medical
staff debated whether to send  him home,  knowing his health  would
worsen, or to  keep him in the  hospital  against his will.'  Despite the
team's view, which was  based on the actual effects of family members
on a patient's  health,  Macklin  recommended  that the medical staff
respect the autonomy and preference of the patient.22
Many  clinicians  must explicitly  address  the  interaction  between
family caregivers and recovering patients.23  For instance, what should
happen when an elderly patient is ready to leave the hospital and re-
turn  home,  but returning  home  and  depending  on  the  care  of an
elderly  spouse  may jeopardize  the  health  of  that  spouse  as  well?
Caregiving  has predictable  negative  effects on the physical  and emo-
tional health of the caregivers, ranging from depression and stress syn-
dromes,  to increased  susceptibility to  physical  health problems. 24  At
the  same  time,  however,  separation  of spouses  can in some  circum-
stances also impair the well-being  of one or both  of them.
As  these examples  suggest, an  exclusive focus  on the  individual
patient's  health  care  needs  raises  two possible  dangers:  (1)  the pa-
19.  SeeJill Klessig, Cross-Cultural  Medicine A Decade  Later:  The Effect of Values and Culture
on Life-Support Decisions, 157 W.J. MED.  316 (1992)  (explaining that physicians must discuss
life-support issues "in a culturally sensitive way");Jessica H. Muller & Brian Desmond, Ethi-
cal Dilemmas in a Cross-Cultural  Context: A  Chinese  Example  157  W. J. MED.  323, 327  (1992)
(stating that doctors  should be  sensitive  to  the norms  of various  cultures  that may  have
different concepts of patient autonomy).
20.  See Schmidt, supra note  12, at 309.
21.  RUTH  MACKUN,  MORTAL  CHOICES:  BioETHICs  IN  TODAY'S  WORLD  139  (1987).
22.  Id.
23.  See, e.g., Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association,  Physicians and
Family Caregivers: A Model for Partnership,  269 JAMA 1282  (1992).
24.  Id. at  1283.
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tient's own views about the relationships with and interests of the inti-
mate  others  may  point  in  a  different  direction  than  the  medical
advice; and  (2)  what would be good medically for the patient may not
be good medically or otherwise for relatives or friends who must care
for the patient.  Again,  the conventional notions of patient autonomy
do not adequately illuminate these dangers nor point toward sensitive
responses.
Given  evidence  of the  mutual  impact  people  have  on  one  an-
other's health,  some  scholars  advocate  a shift  to  an interactional  or
systems  viewpoint  in  addressing  health  care  issues.25  They  recom-
mend a  focus on the  effect of social interactions  on the onset of dis-
ease and its course26 and on providing care for caregivers.27  Thus, the
AMA's Council on Scientific Affairs recently recommended that physi-
cians  treat  the  patient and  the  caregiver  "as  a  single  unit of care,"
while  also considering the "caregiver as a partner with  the physician"
in patient care. 28  As a practical  matter, consideration of the caregiver
would demand reimbursement for physician  time spent in educating
and counseling caregivers  and financial  support for further research
about the needs of caregivers.2'  Along the same line, others urge phy-
sicians  to  use  their knowledge  of family  dynamics  "to  create  strong
family support for the  ill person." °
Each of these  recommendations  remains  consistent with  the  as-
sumption that the focus of care is on the individual patient.  Pursuant
to  these  recommendations,  attention  to  the  family  members  or
friends  is deemed  relevant in  order to  enhance  the  health  or treat-
ment of the individual  patient.  This attention has been  described as
treating "'the family in the patient, rather than the patient in the fam-
ily.' 31  Yet, it is not beyond  debate  to propose a  shift in this  funda-
mental premise.  Indeed,  a few years  ago, John Hardwig shifted this
premise  by arguing  that the interests  of a patient's family should  be
25. John  H.  Weakland,  "Family Somatics---A Neglected Edge, FAM.  PROCESS  263  (1977)
(advocating  the  focus of health care  mainly on  family systems  to  study the handling  of
human problems).
26.  Id.
27.  See Counsel on Scientific Affairs,  supra note 23, at 1283.
28.  Id.
29.  Id. at 1284.
30. Bruhn,  supra note 13,  at 1060  (noting that communication  between  the physician
and  the  family builds confidence  and  is often the  most effective  treatment  available  for
chronic  illness).
31. RONALDJ.  CHRISTIE  & C.  BARRY  HOFFMASTER,  ETHICAL ISSUES  IN  FAMILY  MEDICINE  10
(1986)  (quoting Dr. Michael Brennan).MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
considered  alongside  the  interests  of the patient." 2  Hardwig  stated
that "it is sometimes the moral thing to do for a physician  to sacrifice
the interests  of her patient  to  those  of nonpatients-specifically,  to
those  of the  other members  of the  patient's  family.""  He  defined
family broadly to  encompass  those  who  are  close  to  the  patient, in-
cluding  friends  and  companions."  Hardwig  argued  that  given  the
longer duration of many illnesses and the high costs of medical care,
past assumptions that the patient's interests should always  prevail de-
serve reassessment.35  Hardwig specifically recommended  that the in-
terests of family members be treated equally with the interests of the
patient. 36  Equal  treatment  of  patients  and  their  family  members
would  be  more  honest and more  fair, he  maintained,  than current
theory and practice. 7
Although Hardwig argued for equal consideration of family mem-
bers'  interests, his analysis  does not entirely depart from  the premise
of the individual person as the patient.  A more fundamental displace-
ment of the individual  arises when society itself becomes  the  unit of
analysis, as is the case not only in conceptions  of public health, work-
place  and  environmental  safety  concerns,  but  also  in  emerging  de-
mands for cost-effectiveness  and rationing in health care.  Rather than
employing all possible  treatments for the particular individual patient,
proponents  of rationing  health  care  urge  that  only  reasonable care
should be provided  to all potential patients.38  Critics call this "ration-
ing" and  oppose such  dilution  of the  health  care  provider's central
commitment  to each  particular patient.  Some have  urged  a specific
separation between  the practitioner who delivers care and the policy-
makers who  determine  allocations  of resources.39  Current cost-con-
trol programs  in various forms of managed care  render this idea out-
moded, however, and primary care physicians and nurses have indeed
32. John Hardwig,  What  About the Family  ?,  HASTINGS  CENTER REP.,  Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 10
(acknowledging  the  interests of the  family may  guide and support  "physicians,  patients,
and families in  the throes of agonizing moral decisions").
33.  Id.
34.  Id.
35.  Id. at 6.
36.  Id. at 7.
37.  See id. (arguing that  "medical  and  nonmedical  interests  of the  same magnitude
deserve  equal consideration  in  making treatment  decisions").
38.  See ALBERT  R.JONSEN,  THE NEW  MEDICINE  AND THE OLD  ETHICS 58  (1990)  (arguing
that justice requires "the competent practitioner to treat each patient with as full a range of
resources  as  is  comparable  with the  capability of other unknown  and unseen  patients to
receive  treatment when  their time comes").
39.  For an influential statement of this view see Howard  H. Hiatt, Protecting  the Medical
Commons:  Who is Responsible?, 293 NEw  ENG. J.  MED.  235-40  (1975).
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become gatekeepers  by controlling access to medical  resources.  Done
ultimately in the interests of the entire risk-pool-or community, cost-
containment expands  the notion  of the  beneficiary beyond  the  indi-
vidual  patient.4"
Standard  public  health  and  cost-containment  rationales
subordinate interests of the individual to those of society and jeopard-
ize the basic medical ethics commitment  to individual autonomy and
well-being.  I do not propose  to  import these arguments  for subordi-
nating the  interests  of the  individual  patient  to  the  rest of medical
ethics.  Indeed, I worry that an implicit shift against patient autonomy
as  an ideal  is  well underway.  Given  this shift, can  we  render patient
autonomy  meaningful  in  circumstances  in which  the  "patient-in-the-
bed" implicates others in the gathering of information, the treatment
decision,  the  treatment  process, or the  provision  of after-care?  This
question  presupposes  the desirability of retaining the commitment to
individual  patient autonomy, which  I will  now defend, while  arguing
for a  revision  of this conception  in light of many patients'  important
relationships with  intimates.
II.  PROBLEMS  WITH  SHIFTING  FROM  THE  INDIVIDUAL  AS  PATIENT
The most obvious  objection to a shift away from the focus on the
individual  patient  is  the  danger  that  individuals  will  become  the
means for accomplishing  other people's ends.  This shift in focus that
may result  in other people's  ends being  met  at the  expense  of the
individual would violate ethical commitments  to individual autonomy,
integrity, and dignity.  As I  have suggested, such ethical violations  are
already often tolerated in the name of public health and cost-contain-
ment concerns.  Perhaps these  violations are tolerated  only as excep-
tions to  the rule, or only when tailored to maximize  concern for the
individual  consistent with broader  societal  objectives.  We, or others,
could argue  that the  individual  patient implicitly consents  to the in-
cursions represented by public health and cost-containment initiatives
40.  This view  has  a long  history in  the field  of public health.  For example, concern
about the overall  health  of the community directs  primary care providers  to  refuse  a pa-
tient's request for antibiotic medication for a minor illness  if expanded use by patients  in
that context would risk the development of a drug-resistant strain posing greater danger  to
the  community  at  large.  Similarly,  vaccination  of healthy  individuals-carrying  with  it
some slight risk to the individual-is a pillar of public health activity given the greater good
to  the community arising from universal  vaccination.  Yet, when the societal and commu-
nity  concerns  attend  solely to  financial  rather  than  health  interests,  an  important  and
troubling shift has occurred.  For a discussion about cost-containment, see generally  PREsi-
DENT'S  COMM'N  FOR THE  STUDY OF  ETHICAL  PROBLEMS,  supra note  16, at 95-100  (discussing
the constraints  societal interests  place on the use of life-sustaining  treatment).MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
because  the  individual  shares  in  the  resulting  benefits.  When  the
health  care  focus  on  the  individual  patient  shifts  not  to  society  but
instead  to  the  family  or  intimate  group,  conceptual,  practical,  and
moral  problems  can  arise.  Making  individual  autonomy  meaningful
in light of the intimate relationships of the patient requires work.  The
dangers of shifting from the individual patient, and the steps needed
to strengthen respect for patient autonomy given the facts of patients'
relationships  must be  addressed.
A.  Conceptual, Practical,  and Moral Problems with  "Family"  Medicine
The  interpersonal  nature  of health  and  well-being  leads  some
health care providers to advocate a shift from the individual patient to
the family as the patient.  Yet conceptual  confusion arises with efforts
to articulate a strong version of "the family" as patient. 41  This formu-
lation implies that the family is a reified entity.42  In reality, the family
is not an entity, but a collection  of individuals who have  relationships
with one another.  Perhaps with this idea in mind, one observer con-
cluded  that the  meaning of family,  in family  practice,  "refers  to the
form  of relationship  established  between  the  physician  and  the  pa-
tient,"  rather than the  definition of the patient.43
Alternately,  the  family  as  patient  could  mean  simply  that  the
health  care  provider  treats,  or  is  willing  to  treat, all  members  of a
given family and can draw upon the knowledge  base acquired during
such treatment when dealing with points of common risk or benefit. 44
Similarly, a systems-approach,  as used in family therapy, may guide the
health care provider in tracing the source of medical problems and in
developing rehabilitation or treatment plans.45  These approaches are
ethically suspect,  however, if they permit less  rigor in  protecting  the
confidences of individual  patients, or in guarding against the conflict-
ing interests  of the  professional  who  provides  treatment  for two  re-
lated patients.  Hardwig himself argues that "the idea that the whole
family is one patient is too monolithic.  The conflicts of interests, be-
41.  Ruth  Macklin traces  the  conceptual  difficulty  to  the  idea of  "treating"  the family
because  treatment  in this context  is ambiguous.  "It can  mean  'the performance  of ther-
apy,'  but it also  has a  nonmedical  sense, meaning  'dealing  with'  or  'behaving toward.'"
MACKLIN,  supra note 21,  at 132.
42.  Id.  at 71; see  also Lynn  P.  Carmichael,  The Family in Medicine, Process or Entity?, 3J.
FAM.  PRAc.  562  (1976)  (arguing that  the  family,  as  a  unit  of care,  is  uninvolved  in  the
practice of general medicine).
43.  See Carmichael,  supra note 42, at 562.
44.  See MACKLIN,  supra note  21,  at 68.
45.  Id.
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liefs, and values among family members are often too real and run too
deep to treat all members  as  'the  patient.'" 46
After acknowledging  potential  conflicts  among  family members
facing medical care  decisions,  how should the family doctor behave?
Is  the family  physician  the judge  of potentially  competing  claims of
family members-claims regarding treatment and care affecting other
family members?  How may the family physician or nurse-practitioner
serve as an advocate  for one family member's interests when  they di-
verge  from the interests of other family members?  Adjudicating this
conflict is a difficult task for the health care professional.  Experience
in the legal system shows it is very difficult for one person to serve as
judge without the input of others  entrusted with  the specific  tasks of
articulating  and advocating  competing interests.  If the family  health
care provider is the judge, does each family member need a separate
advocate?  This proposal  is at best impractical and expensive,  and, at
worst, an ill-conceived extension of the adversarial  system.
For reasons of this kind, it seems unwise to articulate the interests
that family members and intimates may have  in the health  status and
medical treatment of their loved one as "rights."  Indeed, Macklin sug-
gests that such thinking  is mistaken.  According to Macklin,  the emo-
tional  concerns  and  interests  of  family  members  should  not  be
confused  with  "rights."47  Instead,  what  families  do  have,  she  main-
tains,  are  "anxiety, fear,  guilt, anger,  hope  and  sadness.  It is  these
feelings that doctors  have to contend with, and that some mistakenly
label  'rights.'"48
The recent history of family practice illustrates similar difficulties
in defining  the  idea of the "family"  as  patient.  This history demon-
strates that departure from the individual patient cannot be sustained
ethically or conceptually.  Launched  in the early 1970s with  the claim
that the patient should be the family, family practice has increasingly
exhibited  a  renewed  commitment to  the  individual as  patient, while
acknowledging  the  individual's  family  context  and emphasizing  the
whole person rather than the disease.4 9  This return reflects both the
difficulties clinicians encountered in practice and general philosophic
assaults on the  idea of "the family" as the patient.
46.  Hardwig, supra note  32,  at 5.
47.  See MACKLIN,  supra note  21, at 132.
48.  Id. at 138.
49.  See CHRISTIE & HOFFMASTER, supra note 31,  at 10  (noting that a "different approach
distinguishes between  treating...  all  members of a family and simply being aware of the
influence  that family relationships  have on  the health  of a person").8MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
For example,  and perhaps  ironically, one  leading critic charged
family medicine  with threatening  the very commitment  to the whole-
person medicine.  In  1976, Dr. Marshall  Marinker charged that family
medicine  undermines  whole-person  medicine  and  threatens  the in-
tegrity of the person because  "the doctor must shift his gaze from the
person  as  an  individual  to  the family  as  a  group." 5"  According  to
Marinker,  this shift in focus  to  the family "destroys  the intimate  and
entirely  personal  dialogue  of whole-person  medicine."5'  Professor
Marinker also argues that the family might suffocate an individual and
that  family  medicine  might  embolden  a  physician  to  impose  treat-
ment on a person  who  has not accepted  the  role  of patient, or may
even  encourage  the  health  care  provider  to  escape  from  hard work
with the individual who needs help.52  In response,  defenders of fam-
ily medicine  retreat to  an emphasis on  the individual  as  the primary
focus  of care,  with  family  members  as  residual  or  marginal  benefi-
ciaries  of help, insofar  as  that help  would aid the  patient.53  In this
weaker version,  the argument for "the family" as patient is compatible
with  a continuing  focus  on  the  individual, with  the  family,  or other
intimates, assuming  importance  only as  the context in which  the  pa-
tient lives.54
Even when defending the strong version  of the family as patient,
family practice advocates reflect ambivalence and confusion about the
relative weight to be  given to individual patient and family member's
interests.  The coauthors of a leading book on ethics in family practice
offer this  as a central  example:  a seventy-four-year-old  Native Ameri-
can woman, who has already had one leg amputated following compli-
cations from diabetes, is advised by her doctor that amputation of her
second  foot is necessary.  She refuses, preferring to stay at home,  on
the reservation, and seek traditional North American remedies.  She is
also the custodian of two granddaughters  who are undergoing turbu-
lent  adolescent  periods.  The  physician  believes  the  patient  should
have the amputation, as this procedure would better preserve her life
so that she could care for the granddaughters.55  It is plausible  to view
50.  Marshall  Marinker,  The Family in Medicine, 69  PROCEEDINGS  ROYAL  Soc'Y  OF  MED.
115,  123 (Feb. 1976)  (arguing that the theory of family medicine threatens the integrity of
the person).
51.  Id.
52.  Id.
53.  See CHISTIE  & HOFFMASTER,  supra note 31,  at 73  (assailing Marinker's construction
of "respect for autonomy as an  inviolable  moral principle").
54.  See id. at 68 (noting that effective management of a patient's problems  may require
family  intervention).
55.  Id. at  79-80.
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the  patient's decision  as a statement of her preference  to resist medi-
cal  treatment  that  had  not seemed  to help  her in  the past or  as  a
statement  of her acceptance  of death.
The coauthors  report  that, in the actual  case,  the physician  suc-
cessfully enlisted others to help convince  the patient to obtain the am-
putation. 6  The  patient had the  amputation,  returned  home, cared
for the granddaughters, and provided strength, stability and discipline
for them for  two more years."'  The authors  conclude:
This felicitous result was due largely to  the broader perspec-
tive  of Mrs.  L's family physician.  If the  focus had  been  on
only  the  individual  patient, no efforts  to  change  her mind
probably would have  been made.  But because the focus was
on  the  entire  family, both  the  interests  of Mrs.  L.  and her
granddaughters  were  considered.  Happily,  these  interests
turned out to be compatible."
I suggest that it is not just "happy," but crucial that the interests of the
patient  and  her granddaughters  were  compatible.  If these  interests
were not compatible,  it is hard  to believe  the  authors would  have se-
lected this case as a central example.  Moreover,  implicit in this story
is the suggestion that the patient's own understanding of her interests
included her commitment to care for her granddaughters. 9  If family
medicine  means  respecting  the patient's  own  commitment  to family
members as part of the treatment plan, this approach is entirely com-
patible with a focus on the individual.  This expansion in focus consid-
ers the medical  and nonmedical  interests  of the patient, rather than
shifting the emphasis to the interests  of nonpatients.  In other words,
the  health care  provider's  goal  is  to treat  the individual  patient and
respect  her autonomy,  but that  individual's  own  relationships  may
modify  her  autonomy  or reflect  commitments  that  the  health  care
provider should, in  turn, try  to  respect  and support.  This  theory of
family medicine  treats the  individual  as  the  patient and  thus  avoids
the danger of compromising  that person's autonomy and interests.
In these  contexts,  it is important to emphasize  and preserve  the
role  of the  health  care  provider  not as  a  decision-maker,  but as  an
adviser and helper.  Much of this discussion  contemplates practice  at
56.  Id. at 81.
57.  Id.
58.  Id.
59.  See id. at 94.  The authors note  that "[c] onstruing autonomy in terms of facilitating
personal  growth  and development  not only is  compatible with the underlying philosophy
of family medicine; it also contributes to a more complete  picture of the physician-patient
relationship."  Id.MARYLAND LAW  REVIEW
the moment when the doctor or nurse explores options with a patient
and considers both the impact those options may have on loved ones
and the impact loved ones  may have  on those  options.  Emphasizing
the centrality of the patient's choice supports the autonomy of those
patients  who  wish  an  option  contrary  to  the  wants  of an  intimate
other, and those patients who place the interests of another over their
own interests.
B.  Moral and Political  Dangers in Focusing on Individuals as if They
Have No Relationships that Matter
Perhaps paradoxically, a focus on the individual patient informed
by research  on  family  and  social  supports  produces  another  set  of
moral and political mistakes.  In brief, the focus on the individual pa-
tient has the potential  risk of subordinating the needs of caregivers-
who are disproportionately  women 6 0 _-to the needs of patients.  Such
an  approach  also  risks excluding  from  health  care  resources  ethnic
and racial  minority groups that have  historically been excluded  from
health care resources.6'  Finally, a focus solely on the individual within
the family  or  social  system  may  end up  blaming  those  without  vital
supports.
I  will  briefly discuss each of these points.  A patient's social  sup-
ports should be called what they are:  actual people, whether spouses,
adults, children, or friends.  No doubt the presence of vital and capa-
ble people can make a difference  in the treatment, recovery, and care
of many patients, but who will  consider the needs of these  caretakers
from their point of view,  not just the viewpoint  of the  patient?  Not
only is there  a basic unfairness  if the  needs of the social supports are
not considered, but there may  also be a systematic  bias.  More  often
than not, these  caretakers  are women. 62  The statistics  show that the
overwhelming  majority of caregivers  are women in the care of the eld-
erly.  A recent estimate indicates that 2.2 million family members and
friends provide health care and other instrumental assistance  to about
1.3  million  frail,  elderly  individuals.6 3  Approximately  two-thirds  of
these caregivers  are women.'  As previously indicated,  the impact  of
such  responsibilities  on  caregivers  may  result in  serious  mental  and
60.  Council on Scientific  Affairs, supra note  23,  at 1282.
61.  See Steven  P.  Wallace  &  Chin-Yin  Lew-Ting,  Getting By  at Home:  Community-Based
Long-term  Care of Latino Elders, 157 W.J. MED.  337  (1992).
62.  See  Council on Scientific Affairs,  supra note 23, at  1282.
63.  Id.
64.  Id.
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physical burdens  to those caregivers. 5  Similar gender-based concerns
can  also be  raised about the care of persons with disabilities, and the
care of transplant candidates.  If attention to family and social context
simply aids the individual patient, and if traditional  gender roles per-
sist  in  identifying  women  relatives  and  friends  as  the  obvious
caregivers  for patients, an inequality in the  distribution  of caregiving
may result.  If those women are also juggling other responsibilities-
to children or to their jobs-justice would demand broader social sup-
port for the caregiving  these women provide  to patients.
Some patients may  have  concerns  about imposing  caregiving  re-
sponsibilities  on their relatives,  while  other patients prefer not to do
so.  Still  other patients may be  willing to impose caregiving  responsi-
bilities  on  their  relatives  or lack  an  ability  to  express  a preference.
Consider the case of "Evan," described  by Dr. Janet Haas in materials
developed by the  Hastings Center." 6  Evan is a twenty-six-year-old  sin-
gle  man  who  suffered  severe  injuries  following  an  automobile  acci-
dent.  After extensive medical treatment that stabilized  his condition,
the  neurosurgeon  wants  to  discharge  him. 7  If Medicaid  would pay
for his care, Evan might be placed  in a rehabilitation  hospital, in the
hope  that  he  could  improve  sufficiently  to  receive  private  care. 6
Evan,  however,  shows  no willingness  to  cooperate  with  therapy.  He
manifests  some post-traumatic  amnesia and shows  intermittent  agita-
tion.6'  Through  a  spelling  board  he  indicates  that  he wants  to  go
home.7 0  It remains unclear what "home" would mean,  since  he had
been unemployed  and essentially  homeless prior to  the accident. 71
Evan's sister is his closest relative.  She raised Evan and several  of
his other siblings  since  the  time  he  was  eight years  old.71  She  cur-
rently works  full  time  as  a management  trainee.  The  other obvious
candidate to care for Evan is his mother, but she recently took charge
of caring for his grandmother, who is seventy-eight-years  old and suf-
fers from  numerous  medical  problems.7'  Neither the  sister  nor the
mother-nor any other relatives-have offered their homes to Evan.74
65.  Id.
66.  CASE  STUDIES  IN ETHics  AND  MEDICAL  REHABILITATION  29  (Janet Haas  et  al.,  eds.,
1988).
67.  Id.
68.  Id.
69.  Id.
70.  Id.
71.  Id.
72.  Id.
73.  Id.
74. Id.MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
The rehabilitation  admission  decision depends in  part upon the
candidate's  final  placement.  The  rehabilitation  hospital  wants  to
avoid taking a patient it cannot discharge  due to lack of a placement.
The  rehabilitation  staff can  sensibly  defend  this  position  on several
grounds.  People  with  head  injuries,  especially,  require  therapy
designed in conjunction with their ultimate placement because adapt-
ability  and generalizing  skills  from one environment  to another may
be very  difficult.  A candidate  who  seems unlikely  to  have  discharge
plans  may  end up  occupying  a bed  that could  better serve  another
patient.  Furthermore,  a patient who cannot be  discharged by the  re-
habilitation  hospital  is  also  likely  to  lack  finances  to  reimburse  the
hospital.  As  a result,  the  hospital  may  end  up  "eating"  the cost  of
Evan's care.
In  this  light, Evan's  case  poses  an  especially  difficult  question
about whether the medical personnel  should encourage  Evan's sister
or his mother to assume his care.  The doctor who prepared  the case
study  recommended  admission  to  the  rehabilitation  hospital.75  He
portrayed  the  problem as  one of risking  denial  of the  rehabilitation
effort simply because of an undesirable  and poor patient.76  The phy-
sician  argued  that  Evan's  desperate  lack  of  nonmedical  resources,
ranging from  an unresponsive  family to  poverty, and  his own  unwill-
ingness  to cooperate  with treatment, should notjustify denial of treat-
ment that could help  him.  This line of argument, however,  becomes
the  rationale  for  pressuring  family  members  to  depart  from  their
stated views and plans.  The physician concluded that "[r] ehabilitation
personnel  must  work  diligently  with  Evan's  sister  and other  family
members"  and educate  them about  his needs,  and  draw  them  "into
Evan's  plan of treatment."
77
A contrasting  view of this  case, offered  by two  nonmedical  com-
mentators, questions this solution as serving society, but not the family
or even Evan himself.
78
It is less  costly  (or so we  believe)  to  have his family  care for
him  than  an institution,  and  his  caretakers  would  certainly
be better off if Evan can be taught to behave predictably and
in  socially  acceptable  ways ....  The  hospital  staff seem  to
have  identified Evan's  sister  as the  family member  most re-
sponsible for Evan and most likely to arrange family care for
him....  Even  if we  are not willing to pass judgment on the
75.  Id.
76.  Id.
77.  Id. at 34.
78.  Id. at  36 (commentary  of Deborah  A.  Stone & David  R. Pokross).
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quality of life Evan might lead given his prognosis, that same
prognosis  tells us a lot about the quality of life his sister  (or
other caretaker)  might  have.  She has  already once  before
carried the responsibility of raising somebody else's children.
Now  her siblings  are  grown and she has  an opportunity  for
some  economic  and social  advancement  in  a management
training program-an  opportunity she would probably have
to forfeit if she agreed to take Evan into her home.  I believe
the  choice ought to be  hers.7"
This view contrasts with  the temptation for any one treating  Evan to
play upon a woman's sense of guilt in trying to find a good solution to
his treatment problem. 0  Attention to the patient's interest alone will
not guard against  the temptation to implicate  a woman's conscience.
Yet add to this analysis  the patient's own preference  to avoid  therapy
and  his  apparent  refusal  to  receive  treatment.  His  apparent prefer-
ence  should not itself render him incompetent to decide.
Thus, in addition to the rather modest proposal that respecting a
patient's  autonomy  includes  respecting  their  own  commitments  to
others,  I  Offer  this bolder argument.  Respect for  patient autonomy
should not entail  disregard for the autonomy of others in  their lives.
This argument gains special significance  in light of potential patterns
of ethnic bias  in the  utilization of health care resources."'
To explore the possibility of ethnic and class bias, two researchers
studied the  use  of health care  resources  by  Latino  families. 8 2  They
found that many such families do not use in-home health-care services
even  when  they  are  in  contact with  physicians. 8"  The  authors  sug-
gested  that "[o]ne  reason physician  visits  may not increase  in-home
health services use is that many physicians  may observe the family pro-
viding in-home assistance  and assume that such assistance  is provided
for cultural  reasons." 8 4  Acknowledging  that older  Latinos  often  ex-
pect assistance from  their families,  family involvement  in health  care
decisions,  and  Spanish-language  use  in  quality  care,  the  researchers
emphasized  that formal  services  could also improve  the status of the
patients  and  their care-givers  and  that in-home  health  care  services
might be welcomed if offered."  Thus, physicians  should not assume
79.  Id.
80.  Id.
81.  See Wallace  &  Lew-Ting, supra note  61.
82.  See id.
83.  Id. at 338-39  (arguing that physicians should not presume that Latino families are
taking care of their disabled  elders  simply because  of cultural preference).
84.  Id. at 343.
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that Latino families taking care of their disabled elders at home do so
simply because of a cultural preference. 6  Instead,  physicians  should
provide  information  and  advice  about  the  availability  of  in-home
health-care  services . 7  Groups that have had  to rely on family and so-
cial supports may risk exclusion from health care services because they
do  not  seem  to  need  those  services  when  in  fact  the  patient  and
health-care  providers  could  well  benefit  from  precisely  those
services.8a
Finally,  is  there  any  danger  that society  may  blame  people  who
lack adequate  social supports if they become  ill?  Or will society blame
people who decline to provide care for their relatives or intimates who
become  ill?  Recognition of the  benefits  provided  by family and  inti-
mate  caretakers  may  point  in  these  directions.  As  Weakland  says,
"[a]ny  positive  findings  about interaction  and disease  might well,  at
least  initially,  be  seen  more  as  accusations  that  people  are  making
their  loved  ones  sick  than  as  a  realistic  and  helpful  recognition  of
how, even  without benefit  of ceremony,  we  are  in  life  together,  for
better or worse,  in sickness  and  in health."89
Danger  arises when attention  to  the individual  patient's benefits
from care  provided  by family members  or friends overrides  any con-
sideration  of the  needs  or interests  of those others.  Overriding  the
concerns  of family  or friends  poses  an  immediate  danger  because
these  other individuals  have interests  as well.  More  subtly, attention
to others matters  because the  patient may care about the interests  of
those others.  Here is where a refined notion  of autonomy would  de-
mand deference  to the individual's  own commitments  to others.  Ad-
dressing interpersonal  commitments  and  political  deliberation,  one
philosopher comments  that
when John or Mary accords priority to theirJohn-Mary inter-
est over their interests considered atomistically, they do what
is best for themselves  as members of an entity they relation-
ally comprise....  The couple John-Mary  is an  internal rela-
tion  formed  by John and  Mary.  It cannot  be  decomposed
into two  radically independent entities, the  (atomic)  individ-
uals John  and  Mary,  because  in this  case  it is  the  relation
86.  See id.
87.  See id.
88.  See Marilyn  Friedman,  The Practice of Partiality,  101  ETHics 818, 829  (1991)  (relying
on  people's  desires  to  favor  their  loved  ones  may  prevent  redistribution  of  resources
needed  for those who do not have them).
89.  Weakland,  supra note  25,  at 272.
1190 [VOL.  53:11731994]  SYMPosIuM:  TRENDS  IN  HEALTH  CARE  DECISIONMAKING  1191
itself, not the parties related, that is fundamental for the pro-
posed deliberation.90
Where  a patient  is competent  and unambivalent,  respecting  patient
autonomy requires deference  to the patient who prefers not to be dis-
charged to the relative's care.  More  difficult issues arise when the pa-
tient  is  competent  but  ambivalent.  Even  in  that  common
circumstance,  I  propose  maintaining  respect  for  the  individual  pa-
tient's autonomy by acknowledging the significance of relationships  in
the life  of that patient, while  also respecting  the  autonomy  of those
intimate others and not treating them as objects  to be manipulated as
part of patient care.
Some  may  fear that respecting  the  autonomy  of the  family  and
friends  of  patients  means  abandoning  the  patient  and  losing  the
chance  to  involve  those  intimate  others  significantly  in  the patient
treatment and care.  This would be a false and sorry picture of auton-
omy.91  Many  wives  and husbands,  lovers and parents,  children  and
aunts, and even friends, will chose earnestly and lovingly to attend to a
patient in  stages of acute and  chronic  care,  as  well  as  in prevention
efforts.  Similarly,  many patients, when  allowed  to act autonomously,
will choose unselfishly.  The crucial role for the health care provider is
not to push  toward these ends, but instead, to  help people  recognize
and articulate  their individual and mutual interests before and during
health problems.
Consider  an  elderly  couple  with  this  difficulty.  After  the  hus-
band's stroke, hospitalization has stabilized his condition, but his doc-
tor  believes  he  cannot  return  to  independent  living  at  home  and
needs the full care  offered by a nursing home.  A nursing home, how-
ever, would exhaust his social security and Medicaid  benefits, leaving
his wife unable  to pay the rent.  We quickly imagine how his wife may
want him  to come  home, and  that he may  want nursing home care.
Yet she may tell him to go to the nursing home for his own good, and
he may say he is coming home for her good.  This version is reminis-
cent of an  O'Henry  short story,  The  Gift of the Magi, 92  in  which  an
90.  ANDREW  LEVINE,  THE GENERAL WILL: RoussEAu,  MARX,  COMMUNISM  30  (1993)  (dis-
cussing deliberations  about "the general  will").
91.  Analogous  debates  surround  contemporary  meanings  of sovereignty  in  interna-
tional  relations.  A conventional  view of the  nation  state  as a "billiard  ball," distinct  and
opaque,  fails to account for the varied  forms of interconnection  and interdependence  na-
tions build  with  one another.  And yet many scholars  fear that abandoning  the conven-
tional view of sovereignty  risks damaging national self-determination-or pushing  toward
more  expressions of selfishness.  See Ann-Marie  Slaughter Burley, International  Law and In-
ternational  Relations Theory:  A  Dual  Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L  LAw 205  (1993).
92.  0.  HENRY,  The Gift of the Magi, in COMPLETE WoRKS  OF  0.  HENRY  (1937).MARYLAND  LAW  REVIEW
impoverished  couple wish to surprise one another with presents.  She
sells  her  hair to buy  a chain  for his pocket watch,  while  he sells  his
watch  to buy combs  for  her hair.  This  story  is  not only a  touching
portrait of love's ironies, but also  clearly indicates that, in  Lyndon B.
Johnson's  immortal  phrase,  there  was  "a  failure  to  communicate."
Perhaps  health care  providers can help a patient and loved one com-
municate  to  avoid  such  ironies.  Perhaps  even  a  third  alternative  is
feasible,  such as sufficient home health  care  to permit the patient to
return  home to  his wife.
CONCLUSION
In  summary,  patient  autonomy  sounds  lovely  but  can  become
meaningless unless it is understood in the context of the patient's real
and  pressing  relationships  with  family  members  or intimate  others.
Yet, a shift in focus from the individual to a broader group as "patient"
raises conceptual, practical, and moral problems.  More defensible is a
strengthened focus on the individual as someone whose autonomy in-
cludes affirmed membership in families and social groups.  Relying on
those others  to help the individual patient may raise issues of fairness
and impose health and emotional burdens  on those  caregivers.  Who
will attend to those caregivers as patients and as partners in the health
care system? 93  Respect for patient autonomy  demands respect for the
patient's relationships, and also for the autonomy of those with whom
the  patient  shares  relationships.  Perhaps  it is  not surprising,  then,
that my closing question asks about the health and emotional needs of
caregivers,  or in  other words,  to  return  to  the Abbott  and  Costello
routine  of my introduction,  "What's on second?"94
93.  See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 23, at 1282  (proposing partnership  be-
tween physicians and family  caregivers).
94.  Pressure  to  treat caregivers,  family members,  and associates  as  patients may stem
from conceptions  and reimbursement schemes that deny help to anyone who is  not a pa-
tient, or who is not sick.  Besides dealing with this problem with more expansive notions of
"patient,"  this society could  consider adopting  other  forms of assistance,  such  as  respite
care, day care,  and a better social  safety net.
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